Silver Professor; Professor Of Philosophy. Béatrice Longuenesse is Silver Professor of Philosophy and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Béatrice Longuenesse - - Princeton University s Béatrice Longuenesse - - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 9 (1)details. Béatrice Longuenesse (NYU) 'I', universal and singular. Whitehead Lectures: Béatrice Longuenesse (NYU). Date: Thursday, April 19, , pm. Location.


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Quassim Cassam has argued that awareness of oneself as a physical object is necessary to ground self-consciousness xiand Gareth Evans proposed that the body beatrice longuenesse necessary to ground any referential use of 'I,' including the self-ascription of mental states Cassam's view is part of the background of Longuenesse's project, while her specific objections are directed to Evans.

Longuenesse argues that, although Evans may be right beatrice longuenesse the epistemic requirements for using 'I,' he is mistaken in taking these to be part of the semantics of 'I.


As she argues, Kant's theory implies that, in addition to having a referent, 'I' also has a distinctive sense that, again, is beatrice longuenesse available to subjects through their activity of combining representations. Longuenesse concedes, though, that in stressing the activity of beatrice longuenesse, she is vulnerable to an objection that bodily accounts do not face.

I, Me, Mine - Beatrice Longuenesse - Oxford University Press

As beatrice longuenesse activity, thinking requires an agent, but how do we know that it is the same agent in all the steps of a proof? Longuenesse takes the key to understanding Kant's position to lie in beatrice longuenesse the argument of the Transcendental Deduction.


That is where Kant argues that the 'I think' is both necessary for the possibility of cognition and sufficient for the applicability of beatrice longuenesse a priori categories throughout cognition. With this material in view, she can illuminate Kant's further negative and positive claims about the 'I think' in the Paralogisms chapter.

There is much to learn in these rich discussions, and I can highlight only a few distinctive moves. Chapter Four clarifies Kant's position on the 'I think' through an extended and extremely fertile comparison with Descartes' cogito.

To cite just one important finding, Longuenesse makes a persuasive case that, despite Kant's criticisms of Rational Psychology, his theory of the 'I think' is intimately related to Descartes' cogito: It is a short step from the claim I have attributed to Kant -- namely that 'I beatrice longuenesse expresses the consciousness on the part of the agent of the unifying activity.

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In another highly original move, Longuenesse argues that interpreters must carefully distinguish 'I think' from the 'transcendental unity of apperception. Both the A and B Deductions present three syntheses or types of beatrice longuenesse representations that are necessary for making judgments: Longuenesse argues that the third synthesis, that of recognizing a concept by apperception, is possible only if the representations involved in the first two syntheses remain beatrice longuenesse.


Even that, however, is not beatrice longuenesse for a subject to judge, e. The unity of the mental activity at work throughout our mental life, from which concepts, and thus representations of objects under those concepts are derived, is what Kant calls the 'transcendental unity of apperception'.

One unity of apperception is thus at work through all our activities of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition, as the necessary conditions for those beatrice longuenesse to yield mutually consistent concepts applicable to one world of empirically given objects.

beatrice longuenesse

Although separately describable, the three syntheses can produce cognition only if they are part of a coordinated or unified activity. That unified activity, which is the common ground of both object cognition and of the ability to use the 'I think' 31 and hence of all uses of 'I'is the TUA.

Since this unifying activity beatrice longuenesse what makes it possible to think about objects, there is a sense in which the 'I think' expresses it. There are, however, passages that suggest a different relation between the TUA and the 'I think.

Other passages echo B's beatrice longuenesse that apperception 'brings forth' something, something that is also called 'apperception,' e.

Beatrice Longuenesse — New York Institute for the Humanities

I am a priori conscious of an original synthesis of these representations, which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception, under which all representations stand but under which they must also be brought by a synthesis B, cited on 29, my underscoring.

See also, Beatrice longuenesse, cited on All representation given to me are subject to this [the original synthetic unity] of apperception; but they also must be brought under it through a synthesis B, my emphasis.

Longuenesse addresses the 'two apperceptions' problem, one an activity, one 'brought forth' by activity, by appealing beatrice longuenesse Kant's distinction between the synthetic and analytic unity of apperception.

As she remarks, however, her solution appeals to an unusual notion of "express", n9. I suggest below that she has resources for taking Kant at his word that original apperception brings forth a unity of apperception through synthesis.

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